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In his Social Contract Rousseau dedicates almost the entire last book to the description of the 
institutional workings of the Roman Republic. This includes a very detailed analysis of the Roman 
voting system (the comitia curiata, the comitia centuriata, and the comitia tributa), an examination of 
the role of three Republican magistracies (the tribunate of the plebs, the dictatorship, and the 
censorship), and finally some considerations on Roman religion, providing Rousseau with a smooth 
transition to the most famous section of Book IV on civic religion.  
In this paper my aim is twofold: first, I hope to achieve a clearer understanding than hitherto 
attained of the nature of the Roman Republican system as described by Rousseau; secondly, I would 
like to shed some light on the reasons for which Rousseau inserts this lengthy discussion of Roman 
institutions into the Social Contract in the way he does and thereby clarify the function of the analysis 
of the Roman political system in Rousseau’s thinking.  
The predominant answer to the question concerning the nature of the Roman political system in 
Rousseau is that for him Rome, as well as Sparta, represented a model of virtue and rustic, austere 
life. In line with what was an almost stereotypical image of Rome in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the Roman Republic represented a form of commonwealth whose citizens were motivated 
by their patriotic devotion to the res publica, going well beyond self-interest and characterised by 
obedience to the laws and a passion for liberty, frugality, and austerity of mores. Since for Rousseau 
Roman virtus coincided with love of the res publica, which was manifested in the citizens’ 
commitment to rendering the greatest services to the fatherland, it follows that Rome was primarily an 
ethical model to which it was also attached a (secondary) political dimension. 
Within this wider picture, Rousseau’s detailed description of the institutional workings of the 
Roman Republic is rather at odds with such an interpretation of Rome and is, therefore, often ignored 
or quickly bypassed if one wishes to reach the much more interesting section on civic religion. 1 The 
rather complex and at times unpalatable subject matter of the chapters dealing with Roman intricate 
and often obscure institutional procedures has further contributed to the marginalisation of this 
important section of the Social Contract within the main scholarly debates on Rousseau’s political 
thought. Examined with an almost antiquarian attention and a modern understanding of Roman 
politics, this section has been open to criticism because of its lack of historical accuracy and, as such, 
has been rejected in its entirety.2 More often, however, this section has been perceived as not adding 
much to the principles of Rousseau’s political thought but rather functioning as a bridge that would 
allow him to reach the description on religion.3 
                                                          
1  D. Leduc-Fayette, Jean_Jacques Rousseau et le mythe de l’antiquité (Paris: Vrin, 1974), 106 claims that this 
section does not fit well with the rest of the work.  
2 J.Jean Cousin, , ‘J.-J.-J. R.. Rousseau, interprète des institutions romaines dans le Contrat social’, in Etudes 
sur le Contrat social (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964), l3-34. 
3 Robert Derathé (ed.), Du Contract social, Rousseau, Œuvres Complètes, ed. B. Gagnebin, M. Raymond et al. 
(Paris: Galimard, 1959-85), III, 1495, n.1.  According to Derathé, the chapters on Roman institutions are a 
subject much more appropriate to Sigonio than to Rousseau, and have only a distant relation to Rousseau’s 
political principles. The true reason why Rousseau included these chapters in the work, he argues, was the 




An interesting exception to this trend is John McCormick’s recently published essay.4 In his study, 
McCormick gives pride of place to Rousseau’s account of Roman Republican institutions in order to 
highlight the nature of his republicanism. In direct contrast with Machiavelli’s anti-elitist treatment of 
Roman assemblies and magistrates, McCormick argues, Rousseau endorses those Republican 
institutions which empowered the wealthy and de facto disfranchised the poor and deliberately 
eschewed magistrates such as the tribunes of the plebs who acted in defence of the people.  
Although this study has the merit to draw attention to Rousseau’s treatment of Roman institutions 
and their value to deepen our understanding of his political tenets, some important features of 
Rousseau’s treatment are better understood, I would claim, when set in the context of both, on the one 
hand, the sources available to him (in their dual nature of ancient texts and antiquarian studies of the 
16th century) and, on the other, the debate on constitutional powers contemporary to Rousseau’s 
writing.  
By analysing Rousseau’s Roman Republican institutions in these contexts, I hope not only to offer 
a clearer depiction of the political system that Rousseau ascribes to Rome but also to show that, by 
describing the Roman political system in the way he does, Rousseau does not add an improbable 
insertion of antiquarian nature in his main treatment, but engages in a contemporary debate on the 
nature of the best constitution. By doing so, he enters in dialogue primarily with Montesquieu, whose 
constitutional thought he rejects.  
Following most likely Polybius’s account of the Roman constitution, as well as Jean Bodin’s and 
Nicolas de Grouchy’s discussion of Republican institutions, Rousseau comes to describe Rome as 
endowed with a tempered but not mixed government. By doing so, he took part in the lively 
constitutional controversy of the time, fought over the model of the Republic par excellence, Rome. 
Responding to Montesquieu’s great concern with the checks and balances of power, Rousseau puts 
forward the idea of Rome as perfect political model where a single, absolute, and indivisible power 
lies with the people while the function of administering it resides with an elected government. The 
duty to preserve a balance between these two functions is assigned to a magistrate, the tribune of the 
plebs, which in Rousseau’s reading is an office outside the constitution, possessing exclusively the 
right to annul political acts but nothing else.  
 
 
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC OF J.J. ROUSSEAU 
 
As Rousseau himself explained to his critics, his analysis of past societies should not be interpreted 
as a search for historical truth, but rather as ‘mere hypothetical reasoning whose aim is to explain the 
nature of things rather than to show its truthful historical origin.’5 In line with this statement, in Book 
4 of the Social Contract he begins his sustained analysis of Roman institutions, which he had 
previously discussed fragmentarily in Book 3, by stating that ‘the historical sketch of Roman 
administration … will explain more concretely all the maxims which I might establish.’ Taking Rome 
as a model of a community governed by a council of two hundred thousand men, Rousseau wishes to 
investigate ‘how the freest and most powerful people on earth exercised its supreme power’, a 
question not so dissimilar from the query at the origin of Pobylus’ work of how the Roman people 
succeeded in conquering the entire world in mere fifty-three years.6  
                                                          
4 John McCormick, ‘Rousseau’s Rome and the Repudiation of Populist Republicanism’, Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 10.1 (2007), 3-27.  
5 J.J. Rousseau, Discours sur l’ origine et les fondemens de l’inegalite parmi les homes, 3, 132-3 in B. Gagnebin 
et M. Raymond (eds.), Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Oeuvres Complètes, (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1959-
1969). See Chantal Grell, Le Dix-hutième siècle et l’antiquité en France 1680-1789 (Oxford: Voltaire 
Foundation, 1995), 1, 460-68. 
6 Rousseau, Cotract Social, 4.3.1 and 4.4.1 from  V. Gourevitch (ed.), J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and 
Other Later Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). All further citations from this 
work are taken from this edition. Pol. 1.1: ‘For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what 
means and under what system of polity the Romans in less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting 
nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government — a thing unique in history?’ 
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Interestingly aware of the scholarly debate on the origins of Rome, as lively at the time of his 
writing as it is nowadays, Rousseau declares that in his treatment of this quasi-mythical past he will 
follow those readings supported by the greatest authorities and confirmed by the strongest plausible 
reasons.7  
He then begins by analysing the rather complex workings of the Roman voting assemblies and 
associates each of them with a founder: Romulus, the first king of Rome, is associated with the 
comitia curiata, the most archaic Roman assembly based on the voting unit of the curia, which in 
Rousseau’s opinion is an ethnic or racial division. In his historical account, once the inadequacies of 
this assembly were manifest, the king Servius Tullius founded the comitia centuriata, in his opinion 
the most important division of the people, based on the voting unit of the centuria and organised 
around division by census. In his historical reconstruction, the tribunes of the plebs instituted the third 
most important Roman assembly, the comitia tributa, which he conflates with the concilium plebis 
(4.4.21). Based on the voting unit of the tribe – initially a territorial division, devised in his opinion by 
Servius Tullius – this assembly was considered the most democratic of Roman institutions, as it 
allowed popular representation regardless of the class of census.  
Although his historical reconstruction of Roman popular assemblies is not always sound, Rousseau 
is undoubtedly very perceptive concerning some of the deepest and most important historical 
mechanisms of the division of the Roman people into political and voting units and some of their most 
important political effects. Worthy of note, for example, is his analysis of the shift in the significance 
of the citizens’ affiliation to a tribe from an indication of territorial residence to a name associated 
with an individual (4.4.11), or his correct treatment of the political status of freedmen and their 
confinement within the urban tribes for most of Republican history (4.4.8), and even the greater 
prestige attached to the thirty-one rustic tribes as opposed to the four urban ones.8  
Having analysed in detail the workings of the assemblies, Rousseau then proceeds to discuss the 
role of the tribunate of the plebs, of which he rather curiously emphasises solely its power of veto. He 
then goes on to explore the two Republican emergency measures, the appointment of a dictator and 
the declaration of the so-called senatus consultum ultimum (a decree by which the senate conferred 
the defence of the safety of the commonwealth on Roman magistrates), prima facie a rather odd 
addition at this stage in the discussion. He concludes the section on Rome by discussing the role of the 
censor and briefly also Roman religion as guardians of ancient morals, moving on to the famous 
discussion of civic religion.  
By analysing Roman republican institutions Rousseau wishes to illustrate one of his central tenets, 
that ‘so long as several men united consider themselves a single body, they have but a single will, 
which is concerned with their common preservation and the general welfare’ (4.1.1). This was the 
case in Rome, Rousseau claims, even if the struggle between patricians and plebeians may at first 
sight indicate otherwise. During that time Rome was in fact composed of two states, which should be 
considered, so he claims, separately. ‘And indeed even in the stormiest times the people’s plebiscites 
always passed quietly and by a large majority, when the senate did not interfere: the citizens having 
but a single interest, the people had but a single will.’ (4.2.2). It is in the assemblies that Roman 
citizens consented to all laws, even to those that seemed to be contrary to their own interest. In fact, 
Rousseau argues (4.2.8), citizens gathered in assembly are not asked whether they approve or reject 
the proposal, but whether that proposal does or does not conform to their general will; the result of the 
majority of votes yields the declaration of the general will.  
During the Republic, Rousseau argues, Roman assemblies endowed with a legislative function 
were the sovereign power in Rome, while the Prince or government was responsible for the executive 
function of the state. Explicitly taking issue with Montesquieu regarding the methods of choice of the 
executive and the judiciary powers, Rousseau argues in a rather Platonic mode that while individual 
choice should apply to those positions that require specific talents, such as military offices, drawing 
lots is instead appropriate for those positions for which good sense, justice and integrity are sufficient 
                                                          
7 On the scholarly debate on the origins of Rome in the eighteenth century see Grell, Le Dix-hutième siècle, 826-
51. 
8 See also Fergus Millar, The Roman Republic in Political Thought (Hanover-London: University Press of New 
England, 2002), 115. 
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(4.3.8).9 Since this ideal constitutional system was embodied by Rome, where sovereignty lay with 
the people gathered in assembly, it follows that a historical sketch of Roman administration is the best 
way to discuss how votes should be cast and collected (4.3.10). The different divisions of the Roman 
people produced various assemblies:  
 
‘The comitia by curiae had been instituted by Romulus, the comitia by centuriae by 
Servius, the comitia by tribes by the tribunes of the people. No law was sanctioned, 
no magistrate elected except in the comitia, and since there was no single citizen 
who was not enrolled in a curia, a century, or a tribe, it follows that no citizen was 
excluded from the right to vote, and that the Roman people was genuinely sovereign 
both by right and in fact.’ (4.4.21) 
 
Of all these assemblies, which to a certain extent fulfilled different functions in Rome, Rousseau 
accords his preference to the comitia centuriata, the assembly organised according to six classes of 
census.10 Since a higher number of centuriae (voting units) were assigned to the first class of census, 
it followed that in this assembly– in Rousseau’s reconstruction – an agreement among the centuriae of 
the first class was sufficient to make redundant the collection of ballots from other centuriae: ‘what 
the smallest number had decided’, Rousseau comments, ‘passed for a decision of the multitude; and in 
the comitia by centuriae affairs can be said to have been settled more often by majorities of cash than 
of votes’ (4.4.28).  
Rousseau justifies this situation, which has led some commentators to portray him as a supporter of 
an aristocratic regime of timocratic nature,11 mainly in two ways. First, he discusses the three factors 
(of social, institutional, and ethical nature) that in his opinion did, at least partially, correct this 
imbalance. Secondly, he underlines an important feature of the comitia centuriata, which, missing 
from the other Roman assemblies, conferred upon it a higher status.  
As far as the three means to correct this imbalance are concerned, first, according to Rousseau, the 
tribunes more often than not, and a large number of the plebeians, belonged to the class of the rich 
(4.4.29). As such, they played an important part in the centuriae of the first class and contributed to 
balancing the influence of the patricians in the first class of census. Secondly, the introduction of the 
institutional innovation of the centuria praerogativa addressed the aristocratic bias of the comitia 
centuriata. According to this ill-attested reform, most likely adopted in the third century BC, rather 
than following a fixed order for casting and collecting votes, the first centuria called to cast its vote, 
the so-called centuria praerogativa, was to be chosen by lot amongst the first class of census.12 The 
bandwagon effect, as Lily Ross Taylor called it, was therefore no longer in the hands of the 
wealthiest, but rather entrusted to lot.13 Again, echoing Montesquieu’s point, Rousseau comments that 
‘in this way the authority of example was withdrawn from rank and given to lot in conformity with 
the principle of democracy’ (4.4.30). Thirdly, in Rousseau’s opinion, what can truly function as a 
                                                          
9 For Rousseau’s quotations of Platonic works see the index in Robert Derathé’s edition in Ouvres Complétes; 
more generally on Rousseau and Platonism, see Miriam Leonard and Jared Holley’s essays in this issue of 
International Journal of the Classical Tradition. 
10 Cic. rep. 2 39-51; Liv. 1.42.5-43.9; Dion. Hal. 4.16-8 – although Cicero’s passage was not available to 
Rousseau at the time of writing. Rousseau emphasises (4.4.20) the total number of six classes of census (as 
attested also in the ancient sources), in opposition to the five classes of census in the antiquarian tradition of in 
the 16th century.  
11 See, for example, McCormick, ‘Rousseau’s Rome’. 
12 On the centuria praerogativa see. Cic. Q. fr. 2,14,4; Phil. 2,82; Liv. 24,7,12. The choice of the centuria 
praerogativa was regarded as an omen comitiorum (Cic. div. 1,103; 2, 83; cf. Cic. Mur. 38: omen ... 
praerogativum) to the extent that it seems that the candidate elected by the comitia praerogativa was often 
successful (Cic. Plan. 49). Perhaps C. Gracchus proposed the choice of the centuria praerogativa from all the 
classes of census. See C. Nicolet (ed.), Demokratia et Aristokratia: à propos de Caius Gracchus: mots grecs et 
réaltiés romaines (Paris: Université de Paris I, 1983). 
13 L. R. Taylor, The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic: The Thirty-five Urban and Rural Tribes (Rome: 
Roman Academy,1960), 91-96. 
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corrector of the aristocratic and timocratic bias in the comitia centuriata is ultimately not so much an 
institutional devise, but rather the moral fibre of the Romans.  
 
 ‘I believe I can safely say that it [the centuriate system] could only be made to work 
because of the first Romans’ simple morals, their disinterestedness, their taste for 
agriculture, their contempt for commerce and the ardour for gain … Indeed, it has to be 
stressed that, in Rome, morals and the censorship, stronger than this institution, 
corrected for its vice, and that some rich men found themselves relegated to the class of 
the poor for having made an excessive display of their riches.’ (4.4.19) 
 
However, for Rousseau the most politically compelling argument in favour of the comitia 
centuriata, which, despite its aristocratic bias, makes it the most preferable of Roman assemblies, lies 
in its membership. While, according to Rousseau’s reconstruction, the comitia curiata excluded from 
its composition the citizens living/enrolled in the rural tribes, and the comitia tributa (erroneously 
conflated with the concilia plebis tributa) excluded the senators and the patricians, the comitia 
centuriata included all Roman citizens, and as such it was in it that the whole majesty of the Roman 
people resided (4.4.34). Whilst the comitia curiata fell into discredit as it supported ‘tyranny and evil 
designs’, to the extent that it was eventually replaced by thirty lictors, the comitia tributa, which, in 
Rousseau’s reconstruction, elected tribunes and passed plebiscita, was the most unjust as it took 
decisions binding on the whole community while excluding senators and patricians from their voting 
body.  
 
‘Not only had the senate no standing in them, it had not even the right to attend 
them, and the senators, forced to obey laws on which they could not vote, were in 
this respect less free than the last citizens. This injustice was altogether ill 
conceived, and it alone was enough to invalidate the decrees of a body to which not 
all its members were admitted.’ (4.4.32) 
 
Alluding to Montesquieu yet turning him on his head, as it were, Rousseau endorses the timocratic 
comitia centuriata as the best Roman assembly, since – contrary to the other assemblies – all citizens 
have the right to take part in it, while the three factors mentioned above correct its timocratic bias.  
In Rousseau’s reading of Roman republican constitution, whilst the Sovereign holds legislative 
power and the Prince or the Government executive power, the relation between them and the exact 
proportion of these constitutive parts of the state is guaranteed and preserved by the tribunate of the 
plebs. In a rather surprising reading of the tribune of the plebs, Rousseau argues that not only is this 
magistracy not part of the constitution (4.5.8), but also that as an external agency it is meant to 
function as a middle term between the Sovereign and the Price and, if necessary, to restore the true 
relation between them (4.5.1).14  
Although, according to Rousseau, it did not have any share in either legislative or executive power, 
the tribune of the plebs was the preserver of laws and legislative power, maintaining the balance 
between the Sovereign, who promulgates the laws, and the Government, who executes them. He 
disregarded the second-century law that transformed the tribunate of the plebs into a regular office of 
the cursus honorum normally held after the quaestorship (and requiring plebeian status), the tribunes’ 
right to sit in the senate, and even to assemble and address it (the ius sentus habendi, which seems to 
have been in place as early as the third century BC). In addition, he also did not take into account the 
tribunician right to summon the concilium plebis, lead the assembly, and introduce legislation, which 
by 287 BC was binding on the whole people and situated the tribune at the centre of Roman 
legislative power. Rousseau, instead, chose to focus only on the tribunes’ negative right of preventing 
unwelcome acts of magistrates, the ius intercessionis, which he considers in its most restrictive form 
of the right to veto against the resolutions of the senate as well as legislative proposals, disregarding 
                                                          
14 See P. Andrivet, ‘Jean-Jacques Rousseau : quelques aperçus de son discours politique sur l’Antiquité 
romaine’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth-Century 151 (1976), 131-148., which, however, underlines the 
role of the tribune of the plebs in establishing the sovereignty of the people.  
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even the right to auxilium. According to Rousseau, the only power of the tribunate of the plebs was 
the right to veto: ‘while it can do nothing, it can prevent everything’ (4.5.3).  
It follows that in the Roman republican system, ‘a wisely tempered tribunate is the firmest bulwark 
of a good constitution.’ To preserve the magistracy intact and protect it from potential abuses and 
usurpation of power, Rousseau suggests altering the temporal status of the office, which, rather than 
being annual, should be suspended at regular intervals. In his opinion, the fall of the Roman Republic 
is to be attributed, to a great extent, to the degeneration of this magistracy, which ‘usurps the 
executive power of which it is but the moderator, and tries to administer the laws which it ought to 
protect.’15 Thus, according to Rousseau, Rome perished in the same way as Sparta did, ‘and in the end 
the excessive power the tribunes had gradually usurped served, with the help of laws that had been 
made for the sake of freedom, as a safeguard to the emperors who destroyed freedom’ (4.5.5). In the 
Letters from the Mountain Rousseau returns to this topic by referring to this very passage of the Social 
Contract.16 It is in this earlier work, he argues in Letter 9, that he explained the good principles on 
which the tribune of the plebs was based and accuses the Roman people of having being unable to 
contain this office within its assigned limits, thus causing the fall of the Republic. By temporarily 
suspending the magistracy - something that could be easily done, Rousseau comments, since the 
tribunate is not part of the constitution - it would have been possible to guarantee that the tribunes 
remained within the remit of their mandate.  
 
From this unconventional role of the tribune of the plebs, it follows that, in Rousseau’s picture, the 
Roman republican system was characterised by sovereignty invested in the people, who upheld 
legislative powers, and a government in charge of the actual conduct of public affairs and composed 
of an elected aristocracy. This aristocracy ensured that those with specific talents, required by the duty 
at hand, would hold the corresponding office (4.3.8). Such a constitutional system was not divided in 
itself, Rousseau emphasises, but rather tempered by the action of this office. As Rousseau argues in 
Book 3, when ‘the executive power is not sufficiently dependent on the legislative, that is when the 
ratio of Prince to Sovereign is greater than that of people to prince, this lack of proportion has to be 
remedied’ either by dividing the government or, as in the case of Rome, by establishing an 
intermediate magistrate ‘who, leaving the government whole, merely serve to balance the two powers 
and to uphold their respective rights. Then the government is not mixed, it is tempered.’ (3.7.5)17  
To preserve this tempered government, Rousseau continues to argue, alongside the tribune of the 
plebs, two additional institutional means must be adopted to overcome the inadequacy of the laws in 
those circumstances in which the safety of the state is at stake. At times, the inflexibility of the laws 
might render them dangerous for the state and numerous cases may arise for which the lawgiver did 
not provide (4.6.1). However, Rousseau specifies, the only occasions when the sacred laws should be 
suspended is when the safety of the country is at stake. There are two ways in which it is possible to 
achieve this aim: the first is the so-called senatus consultum ultimum, a senate’s decree by which a 
magistrate is granted exceptional powers to provide for the safety of the commonwealth, and the 
second is the dictatorship, an extraordinary magistracy which, released from the constriction of 
collegiality, concentrates temporarily unprecedented powers in the hand of one individual with the 
mandate to save the res publica.18 In the first case, Rousseau comments, there is an increase of the 
                                                          
15 Earlier on at 4.4.24 Rousseau had discussed augury as a means by which the ardour of seditious tribunes 
could be held in check, but which ultimately remained inefficacious. 
16 C. Kelly and E. Grace (eds.), J.J. Rousseau, Letter to Beaumont, Letters written from the Mountain, and 
Related Writings (Hanover, N.Y: University Press of New England, 2001), Letter 9, 292.  
17 Cf Rousseau’s footnote to to 3.30.3: following the so-called struggle of the orders, when the tribunes of the 
plebs were established, ‘only then was there a true government and a genuine democracy. Indeed, the people 
was then not only sovereign, but also magistrate and judge, the senate was no more than a subordinate tribunal 
to temper or to concentrate the government, and even the consuls, although patricians, although the first 
magistrates, although absolute generals in war, were in Rome no more than the presidents of the people.’ Cf also 
3.13.5. 
18 V. Arena, Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 200-19. On dictatorship A. Lintott, The Roman Constitution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 109-13. 
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activity of the government, that becomes concentrated in the hands of one or two of its members, so 
that the authority of the laws remains untouched, but only the form of their administration varies.  If, 
however, the danger faced by the state is such that the laws become an obstacle to guarding against it, 
then a supreme commander is named, ‘who silences all the laws and provisionally suspends the 
sovereign authority’ (4.6.4) In these cases, there is no doubt about the general will since the people’s 
foremost intention is that the state does not perish.  
 
Rousseau advances the rather original claim that in 63 BC the commonwealth should have 
nominated a dictator to deal with the Catilinarian conspiracy, since by suspending but not abolishing 
the legislative authority, this office holder would have been able to solve the crisis without being open 
to the accusation of having transgressed the laws, as happened to Cicero.19 
However, alongside these institutional means, Rousseau argues that the moral fibre of the Romans, 
preserved by the role of the censors and civic religion, is an essential means to preserve a tempered 
form of government. Consistently shifting between an historical analysis and a normative account of 
the political principles embodied by the Roman model, in the same vein as in the Letter to d’Alembert 
(although less extensively so), Rousseau argues that the censors are ‘not the arbiter of people’s 
opinion’, but rather its public voice. ‘Just as the general will is declared by law, the public judgment is 
declared by the censorship; public opinion is the kind of law of which the censor is the minister, and 
which, on the model of the prince, he does no more than apply to particular cases’ (4.7.1). Since 
‘among all peoples of the world, not nature but opinion determines the choice of their pleasure … it 
follows that the censorship can be useful in preserving morals, never in restoring them’ (4.7.5). Thus, 
while the censors in Rome should preserve public morals, they neither establish nor restore them. The 
function of forming a more cohesive society by creating an allegiance to the community and its laws 
is fulfilled by a collective code of morality and beliefs, whose importance Rousseau discusses in the 
famous section on civic religion. Although the Romans fade here into the background, Rousseau’s 
argument is clear: in order to maintain a functioning Republican system, it is necessary to preserve a 





It is very hard to assert with certainty the ancient sources that Rousseau consulted to depict his 
institutional picture of Rome during the Republic, and even more so those he read first-hand.  
Although from 1730 onwards the knowledge of ancient languages started to diminish in scope, 281 
monographs about the classical world were published in the course of the eighteenth century.20 
Rousseau was certainly familiar with Livy’s historical account, which was of course also at the basis 
of Machivelli’s Discorsi. This was a book much admired by Rousseau, providing him with the 
narrative of early Rome, especially of the struggle between patricians and plebeians and the latter’s 
progressive advances.21 However, alongside Livy and ancient authors such as Varro, Pliny the Elder, 
and perhaps even Cicero – all of whom he seems to have accessed indirectly through Sigonio – it 
seems plausible that Rousseau might have read Polybius’s work, or at least the fragments of Book 6 
of his Histories which began to circulate separately and which by the sixteenth century had begun to 
enjoy greater fame than the rest of the work. In the course of the seventeenth century, 16 new editions 
                                                          
19 Derathé (in Ouvres Completes, 1497) sees the main source on Rousseau’s treatment of dictatorship as 
Machiavelli, Discorsi, l.1.ch. 34-5.  
20 On the decline of knowledge of ancient languages see T. Schleich, ‘Bausteine einer quantifizierenden 
Rezeptionsgeschichte griechischer und römischer Autoren in Westeuropa 1700-1800’, in G. Berger (ed.), Zur 
Geschichte von Buch und Lese rim Frankreich des Anden Regime. Beiträge zu einer empirischen 
Rezeptionsforschung aus dem Deutschen Romanistentag 1983 in Berlin (Rheinfelden-Berlin: Schäuble, 1986), 
216-37; on publications concerning ancient history, H. Duranton, ‘Le metier d’historien au 18 ͤ siècle’, Revue 
d'histoire moderne et contemporaine 23 (1976), 481-500. 
21 On the importance of Livy for Rousseau’s image of Rome see Leduc-Fayette, Jean Jacques Rousseau, passim 
and 103-5; Cousin, ‘Rousseau  interprète’, 27. See also Millar, Roman Republic, 114.  
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of Polybius’s work were published against ten of Livy, both in their original languages and in 
vernacular languages. The interest in Polybius’s work was expressed in a finer appreciation of the 
quality of his historical narrative of both military and civil matters, as well as of his ability to 
explicate, warn, and instruct for the present.22 By the beginning of the eighteenth century Polybius’s 
work was well known and critically analysed, as attested, for example, by the controversy over the 
first treaty between Carthage and Rome.23  
Even if he never refers to Polybius by name, it may be plausible to claim (although not beyond 
doubt) that Rousseau had in the background not so much the exact details of Polybius’s account of the 
Roman constitution, but rather the general outline of its main principles or, at least, of those he 
perceived as such. From Polybius, who is the first to have used the term, he might have derived not 
only the description of the negative form of democracy as ochlocracy,24 but also some aspects of the 
workings of the assembly and of the tribunate of the plebs, understood as the only office not under the 
consuls and whose power of intercessio could prevent the senate from conducting his affairs.25 Most 
interestingly, Rousseau might have also derived from Polybius the role of civic religion as reinforcing 
the moral fibre of the Roman people and as an essential means for the preservation of a functioning 
constitution.  
However, while Polybius’ influence might be found in certain important political principles, 
Rousseau’s most important source of information about the institutional workings of the Republic was 
Carlo Sigonio’s De antiquo iure civium Romanorum, first published in Venice in 1560. As Derathé 
has noticed, in Book 4 of the Social Contract the explicit references to ancient texts seem to be 
borrowed from Sigonio’ work.26 The paraphrase of Varro’s De re rustica, which praises the Roman 
ancestors to have placed the farmers in the countryside at the centre of civic life, and of Pliny the 
Elder, who reports on the prestige of the rustic tribes because of the fibre of the men who composed 
them, seem to derive directly from Sigonio’ De antiquo iure civium Romanorum rather than from a 
direct reading of the ancient evidence.27 Rousseau certainly read, or at least owned, this important 
book. In his letter of 26 March 1767 to Dutens, to whom he had sold his books, Rousseau writes ‘qu’il 
y a encore quelques livres qui reviennent à la masse, entre autres l’excellente Histoire florentine de 
Machiavel, son Discours sur Tite-Live et le Traité de Legibus romanis de Sigonio.’ As a result of a 
ferocious academic dispute with Nicolas de Grouchy on the interpretations of Roman institutions, 
Sigonio’s work had come to the forefront of Roman studies and gained the status of an authoritative, 
if not the ultimately authoritative, text on ancient Romans institutions. Montesquieu in Mes Pensées 
not only proudly claims to own a copy, but also urges others to read it.28 
Although some scholars have attempted to trace down the influence of Sigonio on Rousseau’s 
interpretation of Rome,29 it seems that no more than a generic resemblance can be identified between 
the two interpretations of Rome – one which ultimately does not differ much from Montesquieu’s 
reading of it.30 However, an essential point to bear in mind - not yet fully appreciated by scholars 
working on Rousseau’s interpretation of Rome – is that if Rousseau possessed and read the most 
                                                          
22 Peter Burke, ‘A Survey on the Popularity of the Ancient Historians, 1450-1700’, History and Theory 5 
(1966), 132-52.  
23 On this debate see M. Raskolnikoff, Historire Romaine et critique historique dans l’Europe des lumières 
(Rome: École Française de Rome, 1992), 427-9. 
24 On Polybius’ introduction of the term ochlocracy see T.A. Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought 
(London: Routledge, 1951), 174, 1. The term ochlocracy, however, was first introduced into the French 
language in 1568; cf. A. Hatzfeld, Dictionnaire general de la langue Francaise: du commencement du XVIIe 
siecle jusqu'a nos jours, precede d'un traité de la formation de la langue (Paris: Ch. Delgrave, 1888), s.v. 
ochlocracy.  
25 Pol. 6.12: the tribunes are the only magistrates who are not under the consuls; at 6.6 for the tribune’s right of 
intercessio. 
26 R. Derathé in Rousseau, Ouvres Complétes, III, 1494-5. 
27 Var. rust. 3.1 = Sigonio, de antiquo iure, 1.3; Plin. Nat. Hist. 18.3 = Sigonio, de antiquo iure, 1.3. 
28 Montesquieu, Ouvres complètes, ed. A. Masson (Paris: Nagel, 1950–1955), II, 84. 
29 P. Catalano, Populus Romanus Quirites (Torino: Giappichelli, 1974), 13-7. 
30 W. McCuaig, Carlo Sigonio: The Changing World of the Late Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989), 178-80.  
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important edition, published in Bologna in 1574, it would have included not only Sigonio’s De 
antiquo iure civium Romanorum but also his De antiquo iure Italiae, De antiquo iure provinciarum, 
and his De lege curiata – a collection that suits well Rousseau’s description of Sigonio’s treatise as a 
work on ‘Roman laws’. In turn, this work would have exposed him not only to Sigonio’s 
interpretation but also to Grouchy’s critiques and their subsequent rebuttal by Sigonio. 31  
Even if Rousseau had not read Sigonio’ treatise Posterior cum Nicolao Gruchio disputatio, reading 
his De antiquo iure provinciarum and De lege curiata would have made him aware of the fierce 
scholarly debate between him and Nicolas de Grouchy, author of the De comitiis Romanorum (1555), 
ever since the first edition of Sigonio’s de antiquo iure civium Romanorum (Venice, 1560).32 At the 
heart of the dispute lay the interpretation of magistratus, imperium, auspicium, and the role of the 
Roman people in bestowing them upon an individual.33 
A careful consideration of the main issues of this dispute shows that Rousseau’s emphasis on 
certain institutional arrangements in Rome and his less orthodox (at least in today’s eyes) 
interpretation of the tribunate of the plebs are influenced by this debate. More specifically, the reason 
for the importance attached to the comitia centuriata, the emphasis on the role of the centuria 
praerogativa, and the rather reductive role of the tribune of the plebs seem all to have been brought to 
the forefront of Rousseau’s considerations by his reading of Nicolas de Grouchy and Sigonio’s 
criticism.  
In his analysis of the Roman assemblies, although improving on the reading by Budé – according to 
whom curiae and tribus were one and the same subdivision – Grouchy established that there were at 
least three assemblies, but conflated the concilium plebis with the comitia tributa.34 This confusion 
would prove rather persistent and reach, amongst others, both Montesquieu and Rousseau. However, 
asserting the centrality of the people’s assemblies in the Roman political system, Grouchy claimed 
that ‘as far as the right to vote went, all assemblies were assemblies of the people, for no citizen could 
be excluded from the vote if he wished to attend the assembly.’35 It was this very reasoning that 
Rousseau put forward in his predilection for the comitia centuriata, the assembly from which no 
citizen was excluded, and which, Rousseau insists, was composed of six rather than five classes of 
census. Rousseau’s claim is rather interesting: the available ancient sources describing the centuriate 
system refer to six classes of census and the issue does not seem contentious.36 Yet it is Grouchy who 
asserts that the classes of census are five and with his authority supports and contributes to the 
establishment of this description of the comitia centuriata, against which Rousseau proudly takes an 
independent stance.37  
Even more striking, however, is, first of all, not only the centrality that the reform of the centuria 
praerogativa had in the debate between Grouchy and Sigonio, a reform that nowadays is rarely 
discussed in scholarship, but also Grouchy’s democratic interpretation of it. This third-century reform 
was interpreted by Grouchy as enacting a symbolic as well as an effective shift in power. Although a 
decade earlier Budé had already argued that the centuria praerogativa would have been chosen 
amongst those of the first class of census, Grouchy emphasised its equalising nature, based on the use 
of lot – the only truly democratic means of selection – and discussed its extension to the centuries of 
all classes of census. According to Grouchy, with the third-century reform of the comitia centuriata, 
                                                          
31 For a complete list of Sigonio’ editions see McCuaig, Carlo Sigonio, 346-54. For the revision of these texts 
and their final inclusion in the edition of 1594 see W. McCuaig, ‘Sigonio and Grouchy: Roman Studies in the 
Sixteenth Century’, Athenaeum 74 (1986), 147-73, esp. 171.  
32 At various times in his Confessions Rousseau refers to his training in Latin, which overall he did not seem to 
have enjoyed, but that should have been sufficient to provide him with the necessary skills to read these texts.  
33 For an excellent account of the dispute see W. McCuaig, ‘Sigonio and Grouchy’, 147-73. 
34 Cf. Festus 47L curia. 
35 Nicolas de Grouchy, De comitiis 2.4. f. 92r. On Grouchy’s analysis of the comitia see McCuaig, ‘Sigonio and 
Grouchy’, 149-50. 
36 Dion. Hal. 4.16-21. Cf. Liv. 1.43. In the eighteenth century Dionysius’s work appeared in French translation 
in two editions: G.F. Le Jay, Les Antiquitez romaines de Denys d’Halicarnasse avec des notes historiques, 
crititques and géographiques (1722), and F. Bellenger, Antiquités romaines de Dynes d’Halicarnasse, traduites 
en français avec des notes historiques, géographiques, chronologiques and critiques (1723). 
37 Grouchy, De com. rom. 1.1. 
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the centuria praerogativa was chosen by two subsequent lots: the first sortation chose the tribe and 
the second the centuria within that tribe to become the praerogativa. In Grouchy’s reconstruction, 
even a centuria from a lower class of census could be chosen, a feature that he interpreted as an 
important mean to temper or even compensate for the timocratic bias of the comitia centuriata.38 
Although Rousseau does not venture into nor hints to the scholarly debate surrounding this reform 
(whose date Sigonio changed to the fifth century BC and associated with the evolution of the bina 
comitia), he too refers to the centuria praerogativa as one of the necessary means to moderate the 
aristocratic bias of the comitia centuriata, emphasising the equalising character of this reform.  
However, perhaps the most interesting influence of Grouchy’s interpretation of Rome on Rousseau 
is visible in the interpretation of the office of the tribunate of the plebs. The subject had been, once 
again, at the centre of the debate between Grouchy and Sigonio, encapsulating the nucleus of their 
different views of Roman Republican history.39 According to Sigonio, the tribunes of the plebs were 
magistrates endowed with potestas, who, albeit with a differentiated role, functioned as an integrated 
component of the hierarchy of Roman magistracies. In his view, the tribunes were deprived of 
coercive powers, of which instead the consuls were endowed, but possessed the power of intercessio 
that belonged exclusively to them. According to Grouchy, on the other hand, the tribunes of the plebs 
could not and should not be fully considered Roman magistrates of the whole populus Romanus.40 
When, according to tradition, the plebeians seceded from the commonwealth, they created their own 
revolutionary and autonomous organisation which included also the election of two magistrates, the 
tribunes of the plebs. However, when with the lex Hortensia in 287 BC plebeian resolutions gained 
binding force for the whole community, the new state of affairs left unresolved the issue of the exact 
nature of the powers of the tribunes of the plebs. While, according to Sigonio, the archaic city-state 
had been transformed into a new patrician-plebeian state, according to Grouchy, the comitia tributa 
had remained an essentially separate, although somehow included, revolutionary body and its main 
magistrates, the tribunes of the plebs, autonomous representatives of only one section of the whole 
community.41 Therefore, it becomes clearer how Rousseau could make those rather puzzling claims 
about the role of the tribunes of the plebs. Following Grouchy’s interpretation of the tribunate as an 
office that ultimately resides outside the constitution, Rousseau not only assigns solely the power of 
veto to the tribunes, but also makes them – in an original twist – the mediator between the two parts of 
the commonwealth.  
A similar line of argument is found in Bodin’s Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem 
published in 1566. Bodin, who had evidently read Grouchy and Sigonio and was aware of the dispute 
over their interpretations of ancient Rome, explicitly opposed Sigonio while indirectly siding with 
Grouchy. The latter, for his part, did not miss the opportunity of saluting Bodin in his Refutatio of 
1567, thereby publicly declaring their alliance and further delineating the opposing camps of this 
fierce scholarly debate.42  
Whilst Sigonio had embraced the Aristotelian understanding of citizenship as full participation in 
politics and, following Polybius, claimed that the Romans had achieved, at least for a short period of 
time, the perfect mixed and balanced constitution, Bodin argued that citizens were subjects of a 
unified sovereignty which, although it could take the form of a monarch, an aristocratic group, or the 
people, remained always a sole source of sovereignty. In Rome, Bodin argued, this unified sole 
sovereign was the plebs,43 and the tribunes of the plebs were the greatest holders of imperium, 
superior also to the consuls and acting as the true masters of the assemblies and the people.44  
In line with Grouchy’s analysis, according to whom Rome was a city-state where the ultimate locus 
of judicial, legislative, and electoral powers was the assemblies, while the administration of power 
                                                          
38 Grouchy, De com rom. f. 44-45r. 
39 McCuaig, Carlo Sigonio, 193 and passim.  
40 Grouchy de com. rom. 3.2 ff. 102v-4v. 
41 On the anomalous status of the tribunes of the plebs see also Plut. Quaest. Rom. 81.  
42 Grouchy, Refutatio 1567, f. 5v. On the role of Bodin see McCuaig ‘Sigonio and Grouchy’, 180-1. 
43 J. Bodin, Oeuvres Philosophiques, ed. Pierre Mesnard (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1951), 167-72 
(on citizenship) and 177-80 (on the mixed constitution). 
44 Bodin, Methodus, 179. 
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resided with the magistrates,45 Bodin distinguished in his Methodus the summum imperium, that is 
sovereignty lying with the people, from the administration of power. In his view, the Roman mixed 
and balanced constitution had never existed, but was simply a myth: the Roman Republic had always 
been a popularis state,46 where sovereignty – in itself an indivisible power – was invested in the 
popular assemblies, the democratic element in the theory of the mixed constitution. Sovereignty was 
also defined, according to Bodin, in the confrontation between the populus and the plebs, while the 
consuls – representatives of monarchical power in the theory of the mixed constitution – were nothing 
more than the agents of the sovereign will. In this theory the senate, representative of the aristocratic 
component of the mixed constitution, was not much more than an emanation of the popular 
assemblies. In line with Grouchy’s interpretation of the struggle between patricians and plebeians, and 
once again against Sigonio’s interpretation, Bodin did not consider the lex Hortensia as signalling the 
end of the struggle and the establishment of a new patrician-plebeian state which integrated the plebs 
fully into the Roman state, but rather as sanctioning the distinction of the plebeians within the state 
and the transfer of sovereignty to the lowest group of society.47 It followed that, in Bodin’s reading, 
the tribunes of the plebs, who presided over the comitia tributa, were the most powerful magistrates 
of Republican Rome.  
The notion that sovereignty in Republican Rome lay with the people and was distinct from its 
government is found not only in Bodin (and to a certain extent in Grouchy), but also in Rousseau, 
whose definition of the body politic in Book 1 of the Social Contract makes an explicit reference to 
by Bodin.48 The idea that Rome, whose indivisible sovereignty resided with the people, could never 




MONTESQUIEU’S ROME IN THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 
 
The most striking features of Rousseau’s Rome are manifest not only in the choice of the comitia 
centuriata as the best Roman assembly, in the democratising role assigned to the centuria 
praerogativa, or in the rather limiting powers of the tribunes of the plebs and their positioning outside 
the constitution, but also in the actual selection of the institutions discussed and the function assigned 
to them. As Millar puts it, ‘Rousseau is plucking an institution out of its Roman context and asking 
what steadying function each – tribunate, (temporary) dictatorship, and censorship – could play in any 
state.’49 The reason behind Rousseau’s apparently arbitrary choice of institutions and his analysis of 
their balancing qualities should be found, I would argue, in Montesquieu’s interpretation of Rome in 
his De l’esprit des lois.50 Not only does Rousseau explicitly refer to Montesquieu right at the start of 
his discussion of Roman assemblies with reference to the democratic nature of sortation;51 he also 
seems to analyse the same Roman institutions which Montesquieu discusses. 
The reference to Montesquieu is, in fact, most evident when one considers the institutional 
components of the Roman republican system on which Rousseau chooses to build his analysis of 
Rome: the centrality of the popular assembly as depositary of legislative power, the preference for the 
                                                          
45 Grouchy, de com. rom. Preface fr. 3r 
46 Bodin, Methodus, 177a.  
47 Bodin, Methodus, 177b-180a. 
48 Rousseau, Social Contract, 1.6. See Derathé ad loc.  
49 Millar, Roman Republic, 119.  
50 P. Andrivet, “Rome enfin que je hais…”? Une étude sur les différentes vues de Montesquieu concernant les 
anciens Romains (Orléans: Paradigme, 2012). 
51 Montesquieu, L’esprit, 2.2 from A.M. Cohen, B.C. Miller, and H.S. Stone (eds.), Montesquieu, The Spirit of 
the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Al further citation from this work are from this 
edition. Rousseau, Social Contract 3.11 on the inevitable decline of even Sparta and Rome is almost a verbatim 
quotation from Montesquieu, L’esprit 11.6. See also Rousseau, Social Contract 1. 4; 2.6 (Montesquieu’s 
L’espirt 1.1); 2.12 (Montesquieu’s L’esprit 1.3); 3.4 (Montesquieu’s L’esprit 7.2and 3.3); 3.5 (Montesquieu ‘s 




comitia centuriata, the discussion of the dictator (and the senatus consultum ultimum), the function 
assigned to the censors, and the role of the tribune of the plebs as well as his right to render null any 
resolution. If, on the one hand, his sources offered him a specific interpretative angle on each of those, 
Montesquieu, on the other, provided him with the basic sketch of the Roman constitution with which 
to engage.  
In Montesquieu’s analysis, the working of these institutions showed why the Roman Republic was 
destined to fall. Its end was inevitable, he argued, as it fell short of those essential requirements to 
create a stable commonwealth, where the three components of the mixed constitutions, understood as 
the three different functions of government (legislative, executive, and judicial) are in check and 
balance with one another.  
In De l’esprit des lois, according to Montesquieu, the Roman Republic was doomed to fail mainly 
because of three factors. First, in Rome the people themselves voted on resolutions binding the whole 
community rather than electing representatives who could have done so on their behalf; second, the 
tribune of the plebs checked both the legislative and the executive power, rather than allowing the 
executive power to exercise control over the legislative power, as he considered most functional; 
third, the tribune of the plebs arrogated to himself the right to veto, that is to render null any 
resolution, rather than allowing the executive powers (senators and magistrates) to exercise it against 
one another. The censors and the right of the senate to appoint a dictator are singled out as the two 
institutional means by which the power of the people, which, Montesquieu argues, should never be 
too strong, could have been regulated and limited.   
Adopting as his sources Livy, Polybius, and most of all Dionysius of Halicarnassus, his main 
discussion of the Roman Republic in Book 11 is broadly constructed along the lines of its 
constitutional development from monarchy, to the acquisition of plebeian rights, to the loss of liberty 
(as a result of the Decemvirs’ ascendency to power) and its return after the death of Virginia. 
Analysing these constitutional developments, Montesquieu follows the variations of power balance 
between the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the state, emphasising how the excess of 
power in the hands of one of the segments of the state would provoke the loss of liberty. The 
chronological narrative fades in the background almost to the point of disappearing in the next three 
chapters, where Montesquieu analyses the legislative, the executive, and the judicial powers of the 
Roman Republic. It is mainly the these chapters, I would argue, that Rousseau has in mind when 
constructing his own version of the Roman Republican system.   
As far as the legislative power of the people is concerned, Montesquieu claims that what he calls 
the comitia tributa (which, like Rousseau, he conflates with the concilium plebis tributum) held too 
much power and deprived a portion of Roman citizens of their liberty. Since this assembly was open 
only to the plebeians, once in virtue of the lex Hortensia in 287 BC it gained the right to pass laws, 
plebiscitia, legally binding the whole community, a situation was created where ‘there were cases in 
which they were subject to the legislative power of another body of the state. It was a frenzy of 
liberty. The people, in order to establish democracy, ran counter to the very principles of democracy’ 
(11.16). Fortunately, Montesquieu’s argument continues, Rome had two admirable institutions, the 
censorship and the dictatorship, fulfilling respectively the function of regulating and limiting the 
legislative power of the people. In his reading of these magistracies Montesquieu argues that since 
every five years the censors had the duty to draw up the list of Roman citizens, thus ‘creating the body 
of the people … they exercised legislation even over the body that had legislative power. On the other 
hand’, he continues, ‘the senate had the power to remove the republic from the hands of the people, so 
to speak, by creating a dictator before whom the sovereign bowed and the most popular laws 
remained silent’ (11.16).  
Responding to this idea, Rousseau intervenes in this constitutional debate by asserting the centrality 
of the popular assembly and its legislative power. In order to respond to the obvious accusation of 
exclusion imputable to the concilium plebis tributum, which he himself confuses with the comitia 
tributa, Rousseau favours the comitia centuriata as the all-inclusive assembly. Hence, having been 
forced, so to speak, to elect the comitia centuriata as the best Roman assembly, he finds himself 
having to dwell upon the means to correct the aristocratic bias of this comitia.  
Contrary to the principles enunciated by Montesquieu, Rousseau’s idea of a popular sovereign and 
its manifestation in the exercise of legislative power cannot admit any form of regulation nor 
limitation. Hence, Rousseau spends some time discussing the role of the censors as well as of the 
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dictator in response to Montesquieu. The censors, according to Rousseau, cannot protect nor reform 
morals, they can simply provide them with a mere form of expression; the dictator, on the other hand, 
in case of public emergency when the safety of the state is at stake may silence the law and suspend 
the sovereign authority, as Montesquieu argues, yet such a suspension is only apparent. The selection 
of a dictator, Rousseau maintains, is rather an expression of the general will and in line with a popular 
sovereign which is not thereby abolished. The dictator, Rousseau continues, ‘dominates it without 
being able to represent it; he can do everything, except make laws’ (4.4.6). 
Montesquieu claims, and Rousseau seems to agree here, that the executive power in Rome resided 
mainly in the hands of the senate and the consuls, whose functions he describes (11.17). According to 
him, the Roman Republic failed because its constitution did not manage to preserve the separation and 
stable balance of its powers. It is, he argues, the lack of checks and balances between the legislative 
and the executive powers that caused a great ill to the Republic. The tribunes of the plebs, who, 
alongside the senate and the other Roman magistrates, possess executive powers in this reading, are 
endowed solely with the faculty of vetoing - ‘the right to render null a resolution taken by another.’ 
He reinforces the rather limited view of this magistracy by adding that ‘although the one who has the 
faculty of vetoing can also have the right to approve, this approval is no more than a declaration that 
one does not make use of one’s faculty of vetoing, and it derives from that faculty.’ However, in 
Rome the tribunes of the plebs extended their control not only over the legislative power, which they 
were required to ‘check and balance’ to prevent one section of government from becoming despotic, 
but also over the execution of this legislation. This, Montesquieu claims, was at the root of great ill. 
‘Executive powers’, he continues, ‘… should take part in legislation by its faculty of vetoing; 
otherwise it will soon be stripped of its prerogatives. But if legislative power takes part in execution, 
executive power will equally be lost’ (11.6). Thereby, the cause of subversion of government in 
Rome, in his opinion, resides in the lack of the faculty of vetoing on the part of the senate and the 
magistrates, both holding executive power.  
 
‘here, therefore, is the fundamental constitution of the government of which we are 
speaking. As its legislative body is composed of two parts, the one will be chained to 
the other by their reciprocal faculty of vetoing. The two will be bound by the 
executive power, which will itself be bound by the legislative power.’ (11.6)  
 
It seems that Montesquieu places a considerable emphasis on the right of vetoing, essential to the 
proper functioning of the state, since, in his view, the two components of the legislative power should 
use it against one another. In Rome, Montesquieu argues, the misuse of this right by the tribunes of 
the plebs, who resorted to it also to check the executive power, was one of the causes that led to the 
fall of the Republic. Rousseau seems to respond to this rather peculiar interpretation of the tribunate 
of the plebs, conferring on this office a prima facie puzzling role. While for Montesquieu the 
tribunician right to veto should temper the powers of the two components of the legislative power, for 
Rousseau the tribune of the plebs, whose powers he himself limits to the right to veto, should act as a 
check between the legislative and the executive powers. When set in its intellectual context, 
Rousseau’s interpretation of the tribunate becomes, therefore, clearer. Rather than a sign of 
Rousseau’s undemocratic bias, his limitation of the tribunes of the plebs to the right of veto sets 
Rousseau’s reading of the Republic in dialogue with Montesquieu’s interpretation of Rome, endowing 






As Chantal Grell has suggested, in Rousseau Rome acts as a normative model allowing him to 
formulate a judgment not only and not so much about the past, but rather concerning the present.52 
Although Rousseau’s discussion of the mixed constitution is set in the context of ancient debates and 
                                                          
52 Grell, Le Dix-hutième siècle, 461. 
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is often associated with the name of Polybius,53 Rousseau’s most immediate point of reference in this 
discussion was not Polybius but rather Montesquieu.  
According to Polybius, Rome was a mixed and balanced constitution with a preponderance of the 
senate, where the three elements that made up the Roman constitution (the monarchical, aristocratic, 
and democratic elements) were manifest in institutions (the consuls, the senate, and the assembly). By 
contrast, in Rousseau the elements of the mixed constitution are neither institutions nor social classes, 
as, for example, in Aristotle’s theory of the mixed constitution, but rather, following Montesquieu, 
functions of government. The Prince is identified with the capacity of executing laws and the 
Sovereign with the capacity of promulgating laws and judging their interpretation. This clear shift of 
language applied to classical conceptual categories makes sense if we look at contemporary 
discussions of the role of the mixed constitution and the separation of powers.  
By discussing the Roman institutions in the way he does, Rousseau is making an intervention in 
this particular debate that assumed central stage in 1748 with the publication of Montesquieu’s De 
l’esprit des lois when separation of powers and the division of the sovereign came, or returned, to the 
forefront of political debate.54 In its purest form the doctrine of separation of powers is based on the 
view that government has three functions: to give laws, to implement laws, and to interpret laws. To 
each of these three functions corresponds a branch of government: the legislative, the executive, and 
the judiciary. The separation of powers consists of two principles: the first regards separation of 
function; the second separation of persons.55 Any function of government must be performed by one 
and only one branch of government without encroaching upon the functions of the other branches; a 
person who occupies a position in one of the three branches must not at the same time play a role in 
any of the other two branches. The idea behind this theory is that if such a separation of function and 
persons is respected, each of the three branches of government will act as a check to the exercise of 
power by the other two, so as to avoid an excessive concentration of power and thereby its likely 
abuse.  
Although Montesquieu argued that the English constitution exemplified such a separation of 
powers, he was aware that to a certain extent this was an ideal type. In his analysis Montesquieu gives 
considerable prominence to the ‘power of judging,’ namely the institutional power and political 
impact of courts and legal practices. In his interpretation of Republican Rome, the failure to achieve a 
separation of the judiciary from the legislative power – as well as the failure to entrust the legislative 
power to a body of representatives – explained the precariousness of Republican Rome and led to the 
astonishing claim that ‘the Italian Republics enjoyed less liberty than our monarchies.’ (11) 
Opposing Montesquieu’s rejection of Roman Republican system as a model of government for 
modern times, Rousseau argues that the Roman constitution until the second century BC, when the 
tribunes usurped their balancing role, represented an example of strength and liberty. Centred on the 
people’s assembly, which exercised the legislative power and acted as the manifestation of the 
sovereign will, the Roman constitution never knew separation of powers, which, independent from 
one another, could check the abuses of the others. Rome, however, experienced a distinction between 
the functions of government, which were carried out by convergent institutional branches such as the 
magistrates and the senate, representing the executive branch of government, and the assembly which 
represented the legislative as well as the judiciary branch of government (and often by the same 
agents playing different roles). The Roman constitution worked on a principle of what Polybius called 
                                                          
53 See, for example, Darethé’s comment (Rousseau Œuvres completes, III, 1483, n.5) on the Social Contract 
3.7. 
54 On the principle of division of powers before Montesquieu see W.B. Gwyn, The meaning of the separation of 
powers: an analysis of the doctrine from its origin to the adoption of the United States Constitution (New 
Orleans: Tulane University, 1965); on the issue of the division of sovereignty and its relation to the idea of the 
mixed constitution see J.H. Franklin ‘Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution: Bodin and his Critics’, in J.H. 
Burns with M. Goldie (eds.), The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 298-328,  and P. Pettit, ‘Two Republican Traditions’ in Andreas Niederberger and 
Philipp Schink (eds), Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law and Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2013), 169-204. 
55 See M. Hansen, ‘The mixed constitution versus the separation of powers: monarchical and aristocratic aspects 
of modern democracy’, History of Political Thought 31 (2010), 509-31. 
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the checks and balances, that it is a principle of mutual dependence that led to a strong cooperation 
between the different institutions, which prevented political paralysis. For Rousseau, the vital 
principle embodied in the Roman constitution was that the government was subject to the overriding 
legislative power of the sovereign people. His preference for the comitia centuriata not only 
guaranteed that no citizen was in principle excluded from exercising his right to vote, but also placed 
an elective aristocracy in charge of the executive power and allowed for the appropriate distinction 
between the sovereign and the governmental powers (3.1 and 3.5). 
In Book 3, just before devoting detailed attention to Rome and its tendency to degenerate, 
Rousseau discusses the forms of government: ‘which is better, a simple or a mixed Government? The 
question is much debated by politicians, and it should be given the same answer I gave about all forms 
of Government’ (3.7.3). Ideally, a simple form of government is preferable; however, to ensure that 
the proportion of power between the Sovereign and the Government is preserved and the executive 
power ‘is sufficiently dependent on the legislative’, there are two possible remedies. The first 
concerns the division of government, which has to be divided in such a way that ‘its several parts have 
no less authority over the subjects and their division reduces their combined force against the 
Sovereign’ (3.7.4). The second remedy, which was adopted by Rome, Rousseau argues, concerns the 
establishment of ‘intermediate magistrates who, leaving the Government whole, merely serve to 
balance the two Powers and to uphold their respective rights. Then the Government is not mixed, it is 
tempered’ (3.7.5). 
By analysing Roman institutions according to the institutional principles that he had found in his 
ancient and early modern sources, Rousseau succeeds in presenting Rome as a form of government 
where sovereignty lies absolute and indivisible only with the people, while the government – 
composed of appointed magistrates – depends on the sovereign, and each power is held in balance by 
the tribunes of the plebs. Informed not only by Livy and perhaps Polybius, but also by the scholarly 
debate between Grouchy and Sigonio as well as by Bodin’s interpretation of the Roman Republic, 
Rousseau’s republican constitution is not a mixed and balanced constitution but rather a system where 
the ‘the Roman people was genuinely sovereign both by right and fact’ (4.4.21). Far from 
Machiavelli’s interpretation that gives considerable emphasis to the antagonistic relation between 
patricians and plebeians, Rousseau proposes that ‘even in the stormiest times, the people’s plebiscites 
passed quietly and by a large majority, when the senate did not interfere. The citizens, having a single 
interest, the people had but a single will’ (4.2.2). Following Bodin, Rousseau considers the legislative 
authority to be the sovereign power, since all other agencies have the duty to apply the law while the 
sovereign is the only one able to make it (2.2.3). Yet he also establishes a distinction between 
sovereignty and government whose function is the administration of sovereignty. It is the 
administration which might be divided in itself and constitute a form of mixed government, but not 
the sovereign (3.7.4).56 Contrary to the principle widely shared amongst the writers of the seventeenth 
century, Rousseau espouses the idea of the indivisibility of sovereignty, which, he argues, Rome 
embodied.57 In addition, following most likely Polybius’s analysis, Rousseau also emphasises the 
importance of morals in supporting the workings of this constitution, and like Polybius, he includes in 
his account a discussion of the role of religion.  
However, in discussing Roman institutional arrangements in these terms Rousseau also took part in 
the contemporary debate on the separation of powers, thereby deeply transforming the nature of the 
Roman Republic. Far too often regarded as an odd excursus that does not fit well with the rest of the 
Social Contract, Rousseau’s analysis of Roman Republican institutions is nevertheless an ideal model 
elaborated by Rousseau as a valid alternative in the lively context of mid-eighteenth-century 
constitutional controversies. 
                                                          
56 On the influence of Bodin and Hobbes on Rousseau see P. Pettit, ‘Two Republican Traditions’, 169-204, esp. 
184-8. For Rousseau, however, as Pettit underlines, sovereignty is inalienable. 
57 R. Derathé, J.J. Rousseau et la science politique de son temps (Paris: Vrin, 1995), 280-94. 
